We study an auction whose outcome in ‡uences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Two explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests among oligopolists. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies for second-price, sealed-bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various e¤ects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also study the e¤ect of reserve prices and entry fees on the seller's revenue and on welfare. We observe that these instruments have very di¤erent implications according to whether impacts are positive or negative.
Introduction
In a variety of settings signi…cant changes of ownership in ‡uence the nature of the interaction in the respective markets. As a consequence, even agents who are not directly involved in a transaction are indirectly a¤ected by its outcome. We refer to such indirect e¤ects as externalities. Well-known examples involving externalities include 1 : 1) Changes of ownership in oligopolies (through takeover, merger, privatization, etc...): since the number and characteristics of active …rms change, all …rms operating in the industry will be a¤ected (either negatively or positively) by the change of ownership; 2) The licensing of innovations (or the sale of intermediate inputs) to competing downstream producers: some …rms become more e¢cient and downstream pro…ts will be shifted away from other, relatively less e¢cient competitors.
3) The location of enterprises, which is often in ‡uenced by the award of tax rebates: neighboring communities may enjoy positive externalities on the labor market, but also negative externalities due to environmental hazards 2 . 4) A shareholder tendering his shares to a corporate raider creates a positive externality on other shareholders.
The anticipation of externalities often leads to adjustments in trading strategies. For an illustration, consider the following quotation from The Economist, June 28th, 1997:
"The good sales run at Rolls-Royce began 18 months ago, when it snatched a huge order to supply Singapore Airlines with engines for its latest twin-engined Boeing 777s. Its hard-nosed American rivals, Pratt&Whitney and General Electric, were prepared to take a loss to land such a prestigious deal. So they assumed Rolls-Royce won the bid by taking an even greater loss."
The idea is that failing to get the prestigious Singapore order puts a …rm in a disadvantageous position when bidding for later deals with other airlines. The need to avoid this disadvantage drove the competing …rms to sacri…ce pro…ts on the current transaction 3 . ) look at a model where one object is auctioned and where agents have private information about imposed or incurred externalities 4 . Their focus is on mechanism design 5 and on revenue maximizing sales procedures. By devising sophisticated threats which depend on the identities of the participating buyers 6 , the seller can extract payments also from non-acquirers. A major problem with such procedures is that the seller needs an unrealistically strong commitment power 7 . In this paper we take a di¤erent approach by studying a standard second-price auction (whose speci…cations do not depend on the details of the underlying situation), and by focusing on simple revenue-enhancing instruments such as (…xed) reserve prices or entry fees. The second-price auction is chosen for its analytical simplicity: it allows us to highlight the interplay between allocative and informational interdependencies without getting too entangled in complex bidding mechanics. A similar analysis will hold for other sealed-bid mechanisms 8 . Besides allocative externalities, many applications require models that allow also for informational externalities, e.g., the externality on buyer i depends both on i's characteristics (which may be private information to i); and on characteristics of other agents, which are not observable at the transaction stage 9 A classical symmetric one-object auction model allowing for informational interdependencies (but not for allocative ones) has been studied by Milgrom and Weber (1982) . The main feature of that model is that bidder i's valuation for the object is a function of the signals obtained by all bidders. Net of payments 4 These depend on the identities of the actual buyer and the su¤erer, but not on other characteristics 5 The analysis employs and further develops the optimal mechanism design methodology for multi-dimensional type spaces. 6 For example, personalized reserve prices and entry fees must be used. The seller may extract payments even if no exchange of goods occurs. Such a "chutzpah" mechanism has been derived in the licensing context by Kamien et.al. (1992) . 7 For example, the threats that allow extraction of surplus from non-acquirers will typically involve non-credible actions o¤ the equilibrium path. 8 Since types are independent a revenue equivalence theorem holds because in our symmetric environment all sealed bid auctions yield the same allocation. For the case of two bidders an English ascending auction is also equivalent to our mechanism, but this does not necessarily hold for more than two agents. An interesting comparison of revenue in sealed bid and ascending price auctions with externalities in which bidders'payo¤s are determined by their own types in all alternatives (which is not the case here) is contained in Das Varma (1999). to the seller, an unsuccessful bidder obtains a …xed payo¤, usually normalized to be zero 10 . In our model, the utility of a bidder who does not get the object is in ‡uenced by the realized allocation (e.g., by events such as "the good is not sold" , "the good is sold to another bidder"). Thus, bidder i's willingness to pay depends on i's belief about potential auction outcomes 11 , and even in a complete information framework (see bidding strategies are not trivial.
Allocative externalities have been often discussed in the large IO literature on vertical and horizontal relations. The type of analysis performed in this paper is strongly related to models considered in the literature on patent licensing (see the survey of Kamien,1992) . Arrow (1962) discussed the relation between the value of innovations and the underlying market structure (which is assumed to be either competitive or monopolistic). Gilbert and Newbery (1982) use an auction model to study the interaction between a monopolist incumbent and a potential entrant competing for an innovation. Their main result is the persistence of the monopolist which takes into account the potential negative externality and uses preemptive patenting. Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Shapiro (1985, 1986) re-examine Arrow's theme, but introduce oligopolistic downstream industries with ex-ante symmetric …rms and speci…cally point out the presence of externalities. These authors study models having the following common structure: 1) The inventor announces the licensing procedure (auction, …xed fee, royalty, etc...); 2) Firms decide whether to buy a license (or how much to bid in an auction); 3) Licensed and unlicensed …rms compete in the downstream market 12 . A main result is that, from the point of view of the seller, an auction dominates both …xed fees and royalties contracts 13 . In contrast to these authors, Jehiel and Moldovanu 10 In most auction formats only the winner pays. In the so-called "all-pay auction" also losers pay. Hence their payo¤ depends on the realized bids, but neither on the …nal allocation of the good nor on the winner's characteristics. 11 To put it more abstractly, in Milgrom and Weber's model bidders perceive only two payo¤-relevant alternatives ("I win" and "I loose") and the bid is determined by a (conditional) expected di¤erence of payo¤s in the two alternatives. In contrast, our bidders may perceive more than two payo¤-relevant alternatives ("I win", "The object is not sold", "The object is sold to a competitor", etc...). 12 Kamien and Tauman look at an inventor that uses fees or royalties, and discuss the relation between drastic innovations and the emergence of monopoly. Katz and Shapiro consider an innovator that sells licenses via …rst-price sealed-bid auctions with (optimally set) reserve prices and entry fees.
13 Consumers in the downstream market have opposite preferences.
(1996) allow for ex-ante asymmetries among the downstream competing …rms 14 ; In all papers mentioned above information is complete: all relevant parameters (e.g., production costs before and after the licensing process), and hence ex-ante and ex-post downstream pro…ts are common knowledge 15 . In his survey, emphasizes the need to extend licensing models by introducing some uncertainty about production costs. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the economic model and the analyzed auction procedures. We focus on the case of two potential buyers bidding for an indivisible object in a second-price, sealed-bid auction where the seller may sometimes keep the object 16 . Besides the revenue enhancing e¤ects of reserve prices and entry fees, the study of these tools allows us to illustrate how related instruments can nevertheless have very di¤erent consequences on bidding behavior.
In Section 3 we illustrate in detail two simple settings that …t in our model: the sale of a cost-reducing innovation (negative externalities) and a merger among …rms operating in the same industry (positive externalities).
In Section 4 we focus on auctions with reserve prices. We …rst derive an equilibrium for the case where the reserve price is not binding 17 . In Subsection 4.1 we derive an equilibrium for the case of negative externalities and a binding reserve price. Some types that are, in principle, willing to pay for preemption, choose nevertheless to make irrelevant bids 18 . We next derive the seller's optimal reserve price, and we show that the seller should sometimes announce a reserve price that is strictly lower than her own valuation for the object 19 .
14 they focus on the incentives to participate in an auction for a cost-reducing innovation, and also show how several beliefs about the …nal allocation might be consistent with equilibrium behavior, leading to multiple equilibria. 15 Most of the papers considering other settings with externalities assume complete information (see Segal, 1999) . Segal also assumes that the principal has the entire bargaining power (i.e, auctions are excluded). These and several other assumptions made by Segal (e.g., only aggregate trade matters) hinder a straightforward comparison between his and our results. 16 We indicate the changes needed if there are more than two bidders. 17 In this equilibrium a bidder takes into account both the expected pro…t if she acquires the object (i.e., her pure valuation net of externalities) and the impact she expects in case her competitor acquires the object. 18 The lowest relevant bid is strictly higher than the reserve price. 19 Setting a low reserve price is a way to increase the supply. Another, quite di¤erent context in which increasing the supply may be bene…cial to the seller is one of common value auctions (see Bulow and Klemperer 1998) . The main phenomena in that paper are caused by "winner's curse" e¤ects, whereas here the e¤ects are due to the presence of externalities.
In Subsection 4.2 we look at the case of positive externalities and a binding reserve price. For the case where the externality is non-increasing in the winner's valuation we are able to derive a (rather complex) symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies which involves pooling at the reserve price 20 . For the case where the externality increases in the winner's valuation, we show that equilibria in pure strategies may not exist.
In Section 5 we look at second-price auctions with entry fees. In the case of negative externalities, there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between entry fees and reserve prices. With positive externalities, entry fees and reserve prices do not have the same e¤ect, since there is no analog of pooling with entry fees. For the positive externality case we also show that, no matter what the seller's valuation for the object is, a strictly positive measure of types is excluded from participation in the auction with the optimal entry fee. This result, which sharply contrasts with the usual intuition, stems from the fact that exclusion also mitigates the free-rider e¤ect among buyers 21 . Finally, we consider a simpler class of situations where the (positive) externality term does not depend on the other agent's private information, and we show that, for each relevant entry fee, the seller can …nd a reserve price that leads to a strictly higher revenue.
In Section 6 we extend our model to n > 2 buyers, and illustrate several facts that are not immediately apparent in the 2¡buyer case 22 . Concluding comments are gathered in Section 7. All proofs appear in an Appendix.
The Model
We consider the following situation: A seller owns an indivisible object. The seller's valuation for the object is ¼ S . There are 2 potential buyers. Buyer's i pure valuation for the object (i.e., his pro…t when he acquires the object) is given by ¼ i . Denote by ¼ ¡i the valuation of the other buyer.
If the good is sold to buyer i for a price p , the utilities of the agents are as 20 An interesting implication of pooling is that sometimes a bidder with lower type may be the winner of the object, thus leading to ex-post ine¢ciencies (among the set of bidders) 21 Setting a positive entry fee is a way to reduce the expected number of competitors, which is revenue enhancing when externalities are positive. Another context in which revenue may decline with the number of competitors is one of common value auctions (see Bulow and Klemperer 1998) . 22 For example, we show that the optimal reserve price depends on the number of bidders.
follows: p for the seller; ¼ i ¡ p for buyer i; g j (¼ j ; ¼ ¡j ) for buyer j; j 6 = i. We normalize the utilities of the buyers to be zero in case that the seller keeps the object (this case is called the status-quo).
The functions g k ; k = 1; 2 which are common knowledge, are assumed to be di¤erentiable. Note that the …rst argument of function g k is always the type of the su¤erer k, and the second argument is the type of the other agent. 
and we denote by F i the cumulative distribution of f i : Moreover, we assume that ¼ i¸0 :
Second-price auctions with a reserve price proceed as follows: The seller announces a reserve price R¸0: The buyers then simultaneously submit bids for the object. In second-price auctions with entry fees, the buyers who participate pay an entry fee E at the same time as they submit a bid 24 . The rules of the auction are those of a second-price sealed-bid auction with reserve price R = 0. That is, if at least one bidder participates, the good is allocated to the bidder with highest bid. If there is another participating bidder, the winner pays the second highest bid. Otherwise, she gets the good for free. Buyers who choose not to pay the fee (and hence do not bid at the auction) are still a¤ected by the outcome of the auction.
We consider here a symmetric setting in the following sense: 1)
Hence, we assume that the externality su¤ered by agent 1 with type ¼ if agent 2 with type ¼ 0 gets the object is the same as the externality su¤ered by agent 2 with type ¼ if agent 1 with type ¼ 0 gets the 23 The reader may have noticed the following "asymmetry" in our treatment: while we allow externalities to depend on others' characteristics, we assume that a bidder's payo¤ when he gets the object does not display this dependence. It is, of course, possible to generalize the model allowing for such a feature, but the ensuing phenomena are well-known by Milgrom and Weber's analysis. We prefered the somewhat simpler model in order to focus on the interplay between informational and allocative externalities. 24 In our context, it would make no di¤erence to assume that the participating bidders can observe who else participates before they submit their bid. object 25 . Let D x g denote the derivative of the function g with respect to the …rst coordinate (i.e., the type of the su¤erer), and let D y g denote the derivative of the function g with respect to the second coordinate (i.e., the type of the causer). Throughout the paper we assume that
The …rst assumption ensures that the bene…t of winning against any competitor, ¼ ¡g(¼; ¼ 0 ); is increasing in the winner's type. The second assumption ensures that the function
is strictly monotonically increasing on [¼; ¹ ¼] : Both conditions are standard: they are used for the derivation of a separating equilibrium in Proposition 4.1 below (see also the use of their analogs in Milgrom and Weber's paper 26 ). We will speak of the negative externalities case if 8¼;
We want to emphasize that these de…nitions make sense only in relation to a given status-quo, which is normalized here to yield zero utility for both bidders.
We focus below on pure-strategy symmetric equilibria of the various auction formats 27 .
Illustrations

Negative externalities: The sale of a patent
Consider 2 …rms in a Cournot oligopoly. Firm i 0 s cost of producing quantity q i of a homogenous product is given by cq i , where c < 1: Let P (Q) = 1 ¡ Q be the 25 This poperty is sometimes called exchangeability. 26 These authors also assume that the gain from winning is increasing in the other bidders' signals, which, translated to our framework, means D y g · 0: But this assumption is not necessary for the derivation of an equilibrium in the second-price auction, and we do not impose it here. 27 The symmetry, risk-neutrality and type-independence assumptions lead to revenue equivalence for symmetric equilibria of sealed-bid formats. For the case of two bidders an English ascending auction is also equivalent to our mechanism, but this does not necessarily hold for more than two agents. (See also Das Varma 1999.) market-clearing price when the aggregate supplied quantity is Q = q 1 + q 2 · 1: The Nash equilibrium the pro…ts 28 are given by
All parameters in the status-quo are common knowledge.
Consider an inventor that wants to sell a cost-reducing technical innovation protected by a patent. The …rm that acquires the patent 29 will be able to produce the good with marginal cost 0 · c i · c: The new, reduced cost c i is private information to …rm i at the time of the patent's sale. After the sale, the new cost structure is revealed to every competitor 30 . If …rm i acquires the patent it earns a pro…t
The other …rm j; j 6 = i; produces with the old, relatively more costly technology and it earns a pro…t
We are in the negative externalities case. Relative to the status-quo, we obtain the following:
1. When …rm i acquires the patent, its bene…t from the innovation is given by
2. The non-acquiring …rm j incurs a loss given by
Note that the loss su¤ered by the non-acquiring …rm is a function of the bene…t of the acquiring …rm 31 (which is not observable at the time of the auction). By 28 sq stands for status-quo 29 We assume that the patent can be sold only to one …rm. 30 To simplify the discussion, we assume below that both …rms will produce positive quantities also after one of them acquires the innovation and becomes more e¢cient. 31 In this example, the loss of the non-acquiring …rm does not depend on its own bene…t were it to obtain the patent i.e., it does not depend on ¼ j : equation 3.4 we obtain
Together with equation 3.5 , this allows us to express the loss of the non-acquiring …rm 32 j as:
How much should a …rm, say …rm 1, bid to acquire the patent ? Firm's 1 valuation is not well-de…ned since it depends on 1's belief about the likelihood of possible outcomes. To see that, consider two extreme cases: 1) If …rm 1 believes that under no circumstance will the patent be sold to …rm 2, then its valuation is
If …rm 1 believes that in case it fails to buy the patent, the seller will surely sell to …rm 2, then its valuation is
s belief, on which its bidding strategy will be based, depends both on the nature of the sale mechanism 33 , and on the bidding strategy of the other …rm. In an equilibrium of a given sale procedure, bidding strategies must be optimal given beliefs, and beliefs must be consistent with the bidding strategies.
Positive externalities: Merger of Competing Firms
Consider 3 …rms in a Cournot oligopoly. Firm i 0 s cost of producing quantity q i of a homogenous product is given by cq i + C , where c < 1: Let P (Q) = 1 ¡ Q be the market-clearing price when the aggregate supplied quantity is Q = q 1 +q 2 +q 3 · 1: Assuming that the …xed cost C is such that operation is pro…table, the Nashequilibrium pro…ts are given by
; we obtain that the function G(¼) is strictly increasing. 33 Iin particular, exclusion instruments such as reserve prices and entry fees a¤ect the probability of a sale.
Consider now the situation where …rm 3 is up for sale and where …rms 1 and 2 bid for it in a takeover battle. The winner i; i = 1; 2; can produce with …xed cost C and with marginal cost 0 · c i · c (imagine some synergy e¤ect) The new, reduced cost c i is private information to …rm i at the time of the contest 34 . If …rm i acquires …rm 3 it will earn a pro…t
Firm j; j 6 = i; that does not acquire …rm 3 will earn a pro…t
Relatively to the status-quo, we obtain the following:
1. When …rm i acquires …rm 3, its bene…t is given by
2. The change in pro…t for the non-acquiring …rm j is given by
The main thing to note is that the non-acquiring …rm obtains a positive bene…t if the cost reduction attained by the merged …rm is relatively low 35 . Indeed, for
, we obtain that
: Hence in such a case we obtain a model with positive externalities 36 . 34 As in the previous example we assume that: 1)The new cost structure is revealed after the auction. 2) Both remaining …rms produce positive quantities after the takeover. 35 In that case the loss due to being less e¢cient in the new environment is fully o¤set by the gain of having fewer competitors. 36 Another interesting illustration for the positive externalities case is o¤ered by Katz and Shapiro (1985) : Two oligopolists o¤er incompatible products, and the consumers' utility increases in the size of the group that uses the same product (there are network externalities). If compatibility can be achieved by attaching an "adapter" to one of the products, then one …rm will usually bear the cost of the adapter, while the increased compatibility bene…ts both …rms. This creates a free-rider e¤ect, and the incentives to invest in an adapter may be too low.
By equation 3.11 we obtain
Together with equation 3.12, this allows us to express the bene…t of the nonacquiring …rm; g(¼ j ; ¼ i ) solely as a function 37 of the pro…t of the acquirer, ¼ i :
Auctions with a Reserve Price
We …rst analyze the case where the reserve price is not binding 38 . Assuming that buyer 2 bids according to a strategy¯(¼ 2 ) which is monotonically increasing and di¤erentiable, buyer's 1 maximization problem given that he has type ¼ 1 is:
An equilibrium 39 of the second-price auction is given by
It can be shown that when R · G(¼), the equilibrium displayed in Proposition 4.1 is the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which the reserve price is not binding 40 . 37 Note that D x g = 0; and
With Katz and Shapiro's adapter story we can easily generate an example where D x g 6 = 0. 38 i.e., all valuations (including externality e¤ects) lie above the reserve price. 39 If there are only two bidders and if the reserve price is not binding, there are only two possible physical outcomes (the good ends up in the hands of one of the two bidders). Hence, each bidder perceives only two payo¤ relevant alternatives and our equilibrium has the same ‡avor as the one exhibited by Milgrom and Weber in their symmetric model without allocative externalities. Upon winning the object, the marginal type of the other bidder coincides with the bidder's own type. 40 Standard arguments can be used to show that this is the only pure-strategy symmetric separating equilibrium (in which the reserve price is not binding). The reason why there cannot be pooling in a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies (in which the reserve price is not binding) is analogous to the argument of Lemma 8.1 below.
We next derive equilibria for auctions with a binding reserve price. The main di¢culty is that various types hold di¤erent beliefs about the possible …nal allocation 41 . Since the impact of a loss to the other buyer is di¤erent from the impact of the seller keeping the object 42 , we obtain an optimal reaction function for each of the two possible beliefs about the …nal outcome, respectively. The two reaction functions must be combined to form an overall optimal bidding strategy. For the negative externality case, the two intervals of types (each holding another belief) are separate, and we always …nd an equilibrium in pure strategies. For the positive externality case it is usually impossible to have separate intervals, and an equilibrium in pure strategies (if it exists!) must display a region of pooling.
Negative externalities
Assume that G(¼) · R · G(¼);and consider the type G ¡1 (R) which is given by the unique solution to the equation
The interesting part in the determination of equilibrium is the prescription for buyers with valuations in the interval [G ¡1 (R); R). Given a reserve price R , these types are interested in the good purely for preemptive reasons and they are, in principle, willing to pay more than R for preemption. But, given the equilibrium actions of the other bidder, a buyer with valuation in the interval [G ¡1 (R); R) has a chance to get the good only when the other bidder bids less than R. In this case the good will not be sold to the competitor, and preemption is therefore not necessary. Hence, bidding zero is ultimately optimal. The lowest relevant bid is G(R) which is strictly above R if g(R; R) < 0 43 .
Proposition 4.2. Assume that externalities are negative. An equilibrium of the second-price auction with reserve price R;
41 A bidder with a relatively high valuation expects the good to be sold for sure, and the e¤ective competition is provided by the other bidder, while for bidders with relatively low valuations the e¤ective competition is provided by the seller's reserve price.
42 This is normalized here to be zero. 43 Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) discuss this point for the case of constant negative externalities.
Except for the indeterminacy of bids for types below R, the above displayed strategies constitute the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium 44 . We now turn to the seller's optimal reserve price policy. The seller's expected revenue is given by:
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to R we obtain:
The thing to note is the extra term involving g(R; R) 45 : Assuming an interior maximum, the equation that determines the optimal reserve price is R opt de…ned by:
Since g(R opt ; R opt ) · 0; it may happen that the seller optimally announces a reserve price which is strictly lower than her own valuation. The intuition is as follows: when the seller sells more often, the buyers are more afraid that the good will fall in the hands of the competitor, and they bid more aggressively. If the seller's valuation is relatively low, the gain of having higher bids fully o¤sets the loss su¤ered in cases where the good is sold at a price below valuation.
It is instructive to relate the revenue maximizing and the welfare maximizing levels of R 46 . In the negative externality case, we have seen that R opt < ¼ S is possible. It is readily veri…ed that the welfare maximizing reserve price R w must satisfy R w¸¼S . The expected social welfare as a function of R is given by:
44 If G(¼) > R > ¼, there are two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies: one in which the reserve price is binding and one in which it is not. This is related to the multiplicity of consistent equilibrium beliefs (leading to multiple equilibria) displayed in . 45 Observe that without externalities the optimal reserve price, R opt ; satis…es the equation
f (Ropt) = ¼ S ; and hence R opt¸¼S : This con…rms the usual economic intuition about the monopolist that restricts supply. 46 Recall that, without externalities, the monopolist seller sells "too seldom" from an e¢ciency viewpoint.
We obtain that
Since g is non-positive, R w must lie above ¼ S (and hence possibly above R opt ). . We obtain that:
The optimal reserve price R opt , as a function of the seller's valuation ¼ S ; is as follows:
; if 0:8094
(4.10)
Note that a seller with a low positive valuation prefers to set a reservation price equal to zero. At the cuto¤-value ¼ S = 0:8094 the loss of selling below valuation becomes too high, and the optimal reserve price displays a discrete jump (the pro…t function is continuous though). If , for example,
we obtain R opt = 0;while the welfare-maximizing reserve price is R w = 0:78: Hence, a revenue-maximizing seller sells "too often".
Positive Externalities
In this section we study equilibria for the case where the seller imposes a binding reserve price and there are positive externalities.
Assume that G(¼)¸R¸¼¸0 and let again G ¡1 (R) denote the unique solution to the equation
We …rst observe that a pure strategy symmetric separating equilibrium does not exist. To see this, note that in a symmetric equilibrium, buyer i with type cannot constitute an equilibrium: If bidder 2 bids G(¼ 2 ) for ¼ 2¸¼ ¤¸G¡1 (R); and zero otherwise, then bidder 1 with a type ¼ 1 slightly below G ¡1 (R) strictly prefers to bid R instead of zero, since this allows her to win the good (thus making an additional strictly positive pro…t) whenever ¼ 2 < ¼ ¤ : Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium there must be some pooling. The intuition is as follows. Bidders with low pure valuation must compete against the seller's reserve price, and they must take into account that no sale is a possible outcome. As a result, such bidders may bid more aggressively than buyers with higher valuations who are sure that a sale will occur 48 . On the other hand, by incentive compatibility arguments, buyers with lower types cannot get the good more often than buyers with higher types. These con ‡icting forces result in pooling at the bid where the belief about potential outcomes switches, i.e., exactly at the reserve price R. If D y g · 0 49 ; an equilibrium can be obtained by a careful construction of the interval of types that pool at R :
1. There is a type1; R · e ¼ · G ¡1 (R);which is indi¤erent between a bid of zero and a bid equal to R; and there is a type e e ¼; G ¡1 (R) · e e ¼ · ¹ ¼; which is indi¤erent between any two bids in the interval [R; G( e e ¼)]:
2. All types in the interval [1; e e ¼) make the same bid 50 , equal to R (and this bid is strictly preferred to any other bid).
3. All types below e ¼ bid zero, and, …nally, all types ¼¸e e ¼ bid G(¼):
The next Lemma characterizes the extremities of the pooling interval [1; e e ¼) :
Lemma 4.4. Assume that D y g · 0; and that for all ¼¸R; ¹ ¼ ¡ g(¹ ¼; ¼)¸R: The system of equations:
48 Note that, with positive externalities, a buyer believing that the good will not be sold (if he himself does not acquire it) is prepared to pay more than than a buyer with the same pure valuation believing that the good will be sold for sure. 49 Observe that this assumption …ts with the positive externality example provided in Section 3.
50 Haile (1999) illustrates this construction in an auction model with resale opportunities. Since a loser at the auction has a chance to buy the good in the resale market, his model displays positive externalities. has a solution (u; z) = (e ¼; e e ¼) such that
Proposition 4.5. Assume that D y g · 0 and that, for all ¼¸R; ¹ ¼¡g(¹ ¼; ¼)¸R: Let (e ¼; e e ¼) be a solution of the system 4.11 that satis…es R · e ¼ · G ¡1 (R) and
The strategy pro…le
(4.12) constitutes a Nash equilibrium 51 .
An implication of pooling is that even when the good is sold, it is not necessarily sold to the e¢cient buyer.
Our next result looks at the case where the externality function does not depend at all on the type of the acquirer. In this case the determination of the pooling interval is somewhat simpler, as the upper end of the pooling interval is exactly 
(4.13) 51 Assume that for all ¼¸R; and for all
roughly, that the externality in all relevant cases is higher than the gain of acquiring the object). In this case, no matter what u¸R is, there is no z¸u such that the second equation in the system 4.11 holds. This implies that the system of equations does not have a solution such that e e
The equilibrium of the auction is then given by constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We …nally show by way of example that equilibria in pure strategies may fail to exist when the condition D y g · 0 is not satis…ed 53 .
Proposition 4.7. Assume that each buyer's valuation ¼ i is drawn from the interval [0; 1] with density f (¼ i ) = 1: Let the externality function be given by g(¼; ¼ 0 ) = k¼ 0 where 0 < k < 1; and let the reserve price R be such that 0 < R < 1 ¡ k 54 : Then there are no equilibria in pure strategies.
Second-Price Auctions with an Entry Fee
Assume now that the seller sells through a second-price auction with an entry fee E; 0 < E · ¼ (see description in Section 2). Whenever a bidder decides to participate, it is clear that competition is against the other bidder (if any) and not against the seller, who has committed to sell the object. This is the main di¤erence between positive entry fees and positive reserve prices.
The following Proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior in auctions with entry fees (irrespective of the sign of the externalities). 
enter, and bid G(
constitutes a Nash equilibrium 55 .
We now compute the seller's revenue in an auction with an entry fee E . Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between E and ¼ E ; we can write the seller's revenue as a function of ¼ E : The revenue is :
we obtain e e ¼ < G ¡1 (R): This means that a type slightly above e e ¼ prefers to bid above R; but type G ¡1 (R) never bids above R: Hence the single crossing of incremental returns, which is a su¢cient condition for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, is not satis…ed (see Athey, 1999) . 54 The condition
is an equilibrium of the form
) 55 This is the unique pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
Di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to ¼ E ; we obtain:
For the case of non-positive externalities we obtain that any entry fee policy is revenue equivalent to an appropriately constructed reserve price policy, and vice-versa. Indeed, observe the analogy between the expression above and the respective expression in the reserve price policy (Equation 4.6). In particular, the optimal entry fee is given by E opt = R opt ¢ F (R opt ):
We now turn to the case of positive externalities, and we …rst illustrate a rather surprising phenomenon arising in this case. The standard economic intuition for the case without externalities is as follows: When the demand parameters (here buyers' valuations) are much larger than the supply parameters (here the seller's valuation), supply restriction (here exclusion) does not make sense since lost sale opportunities cannot be compensated by the higher payments. With positive externalities, exclusion has an additional e¤ect: by selling less often the seller mitigates the free-rider e¤ect among buyers. It is interesting that the free-riding mitigation e¤ect is always stronger than the lost-opportunities e¤ect.
Example 5.3. Each buyer's valuation ¼ i is drawn from the interval [0; 1] with density f(¼ i ) = 1: Let the externality be g(¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 )´1 2 . We obtain that:
The optimal cut-o¤ type ¼ opt (¼ S ) is given by :
It is also worth noting that, with positive externalities, the welfare maximizing entry fee is always smaller than the revenue maximizing entry fee. Denoting by W (¼ E ) the expected welfare associated with entry fee E, we obtain :
Since g is non-negative, we obtain
showing that cuto¤ type ¼ w corresponding to the welfare maximizing entry fee E w satis…es ¼ w < ¼ S . In contrast, expression 5.3 shows that the cut-o¤ type ¼ opt corresponding to the revenue maximizing entry fee E opt must satisfy ¼ opt > ¼ S .
Propositions 5.1 and 4.5 reveal that entry fees and reserve prices are not equivalent in the positive externality case 56 . We prove below that the seller is better-o¤ using a reserve price if the externality term does not depend on the competitor's valuation.
For each auction with an entry fee there is an auction with reserve price that yields a strictly higher revenue for the seller.
Extension to n > 2 Buyers
We now comment on the extension of our symmetric model to more than two bidders.
Buyers' pure valuations are private information, and they are all independently drawn from the interval [¼; ¹ ¼] according with the density f . We denote by F the distribution of f:
Let ¼ = (¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ; :::; ¼ n ) . We denote by ¼ ¡ij the vector obtained from ¼ by deleting the coordinates i; j; i 6 = j; and by ¼ max ¡ij the largest coordinate of ¼ ¡ij: . Let ¼ be the vector of pure valuations. If the good is sold to buyer i for a price p , the utilities of the agents are as follows: p for the seller;
A symmetric setting is characterized by the existence of a function g : < N ! R; symmetric in its last n ¡ 2 coordinates, such that if any buyer i with type ¼ i obtains the object, the externality on any buyer j; j 6 = i; with type ¼ j is given by
With suitable assumptions that ensure monotonicity 57 , an equilibrium in a pure second-price auction is given by:
where ¼ max ¡ij denoted the maximum of buyers k, k 6 = i; j, types. The symmetry assumption ensures that the above expression does not depend on the choice of j; j 6 = i; and that all buyers with the same type make the same bid 58 (i.e., the equilibrium is symmetric). The equilibrium for the negative externality case with a binding reserve price is similar to the one derived for the setting with only two buyers: All types below R bid zero, and types above R bid according to expression 6.1.
A phenomenon which is not apparent for n = 2 is the fact that the optimal reserve price does, in general, depend on the number of buyers n 59 : For a simple illustration of this dependence, consider the case where for any number n2 of potential buyers, the externality if the good falls in the hands of another is constant, and equal to ® · 0: Then, for each buyer i , the equilibrium bidding 57 Denote by D x g the derivative of the externality function with respect to own type, by D y g the derivative with respect to the type of the winner (when di¤erent from oneself) and by D z g the derivative with respect to the type of another non-acquiring buyer (by symmetry, D y g and D z g do not depend on identities). By analogy to Milgrom and Weber's model, su¢cient conditions for monotonicity are given by: 1 ¡ D x g > 0 ; ¡D y g¸0 ; ¡D z g¸0:
58 The event that determines the bid is that where one of the other bidders has the same valuation, and all other bidders have a lower valuation. 59 The optimal reserve price in the symmetric independent private values case without externalities case does not depend on n. This is a somewhat surprising, but well known result (see, for example, Myerson (1981) ). strategy is given by
The optimal reserve price will depend on n unless the total externality imposed by any buyer, (n ¡ 1)®; is kept constant as n varies 60 . An equilibrium for the n-buyer case with positive externalities (whenever it exists and it is not trivial) displays a region of pooling, as before. The only signi…cant change is the derivation 61 of the critical types1(n); e e ¼(n) . For a simple, example, assume that for any number n¸2 of potential buyers, the externality is constant, and equal to ®¸0. Assume also that ¼¡®¸0: We are then in a similar case to the one covered by Corollary 4.6, and e e ¼(n)´R + ®: By keeping R constant, and by maintaining the symmetric tie-breaking rule, one obtains that lim n!11 (n) = G ¡1 (R) = R + ® 62 : Finally, the equilibrium for the auction with an entry fee is analogous to the 2¡ buyer case. The critical type ¼ E is given by the unique solution to the equation E = u ¢ (F (u)) n¡1 : All types below ¼ E do not enter the auction, and all types above bid according to expression 6.1. 60 Situations where the su¤ering decreases if it is shared among many is captured by the old saying: "Misery loves company". 61 It should be clear from the argument for n = 2 that this derivation depends on the number of bidders, not the least through the speci…cation of the tie-breaking rule. 62 The intuition is as follows: as n ! 1, the probability that the good is eventually sold (even if there is a positive reserve price) goes to 1. Hence, as n ! 1 , a bid of zero becomes attractive for higher valuation types since, in the limit, a payo¤ of ® is assured with probability one. On the other hand, the probability of winning the good with the minimal bid R goes to zero, and this bid is optimal for fewer and fewer types.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored bidding behavior in contexts where there are externalities between bidders, and where these externalities depend on characteristics that may not be observable at the time of the auction. The main driving force is the fact that a buyer's willingness to pay (which determines the bid) depends on several potential scenarios about the …nal allocation of the good (which is, in turn, determined by the bids at the auction). While studying the e¤ects of standard tools such as reserve prices and entry fees, we have illustrated several important qualitative di¤erences between the cases where externalities are positive or negative.
It is still an open question whether mixed-strategy Nash equilibria exist in auctions with a reserve price when the positive externality increases in the competitor's valuation 63 . Throughout the paper we have abstracted from the possibility that the bids at the auction may serve as signals that in ‡uence beliefs in the future interaction. Another relevant extension is obtained by endowing the seller with several objects (licenses, say). But the analysis of bidding behavior in standard multi-object auctions with informational and allocative externalities is likely to be very complex 64 . These subjects will be treated in future work.
Di¤erentiating the above expression with respect to b we obtain:
By symmetry we must have in equilibrium that¯¡ 1 (b) = ¼ 1 : Hence, we obtain:
We now prove that the strategy b(¼ 1 ) = G(¼ 1 ) is optimal for buyer 1 , given that buyer 2 plays the strategy b(¼ 2 ) = G(¼ 2 ): Assume that buyer 2 has type ¼ 2 . When buyer 1 bids above G(¼ 2 ), he gets the good and his payo¤ is ¼ 1 ¡ G(¼ 2 ): When he bids below G(¼ 2 ); buyer 2 gets the good, and buyer 1's payo¤ is g(¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ): By the Mean Value Theorem we have that
By the monotonicity of the function G(¼) , the bidding function b(¼ 1 ) = G(¼ 1 ) satis…es all these optimality requirements for all ¼ 1 :
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Assume that buyer 2 bids according to the strategy in the statement of the Proposition. Consider now buyer 1, and assume that ¼ 1 2 [¼; R): For such a type, bidding zero (or any other bid below R) yields
Since ¼ 1 · R; the …rst integral is negative, and bidding zero is preferred to bidding b; R · b · G(R): Finally, bidding b¸G(R), yields
(The last equality holds for a certain µ 2 [¼ 1 ; ¼ 2 ] and follows by the Mean Value Theorem). Hence bidding G(R) is preferred to any other bid b¸G(R): Since we showed above that all bids below R (which are equivalent) are preferred to a bid of G(R); we obtain that a bid of zero is optimal for all ¼ 1 · R:
The proof that bidding G(¼ 1 ) is optimal for types ¼ 1 2 [R; ¹ ¼] is analogous to the one of Proposition 4.1 and is omitted here.
Proof of Lemma 4.4
Fix u such that R · u · G ¡1 (R); and consider the equation
By the de…nition of G ¡1 (R); and by D y g · 0; we obtain that P (G ¡1 (R)) · 0: By the Mean Value Theorem, we obtain that
By the implicit function theorem, the function z(u) is continuous. Consider now the continuous function
Note that
We have H(R) · 0: By the Mean Value Theorem we obtain also that
where
, and by D y g · 0; we obtain that H(G ¡1 (R))¸0: Hence the equation
where e e ¼ = z(e ¼) is a solution of the system, as required.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Assume that buyer 2 uses the above strategy, and consider a type ¼ 1 2 [¼; G ¡1 (R)] of buyer 1. Bidding zero (or any other bid strictly below R) yields:
Bidding R yields:
The solution need not be unique. It is unique, if, for example, D x g · 0: A more general suf…cient condition for uniqueness is given by :8z; the function log[g(v; z) ¢ (1 ¡ F (v))] is increasing in v:
Type e ¼ is indi¤erent between bidding zero and bidding R 66 , and:
Further, we have:
, and bidding R is better than bidding zero for these types. Similarly, bidding zero is better than bidding R for types
In fact, it easily follows that a bid of zero is optimal for types ¼ 1 2 [¼; e ¼]: Note also that1¸R (since the …rst equation in system 4.11 does not admit solutions with u < R .)
We now show that a bid of R is optimal for all types ¼ 1 2 [e ¼; e e ¼]: We still need to consider alternative bids b > R: There are two cases: Assume …rst that G ¡1 (b) · e e ¼: Then bidding b > R yields :
Then bidding b > R yields :
¼ we have then that 67 :
¼ we have then that:
We need to show that 
Since D x g(¿; ¼ 2 ) · 1; each term in the summation is non-negative, and therefore the integral is non-negative.
Consider now the …rst integral in equation 8.21 (which is also the only expression appearing in equation 8.20), and let
68 . This shows, in particular, that the type e e ¼ is indi¤erent between bidding R; and bidding any bid b 2 (R; G( e e ¼)]: Note also that 
is continuous. Since G ¡1 (R)¸R and h(u)¸0; it holds that:
The system of equations 4.11 becomes now
We now show that the pair (u; z) = (e ¼; G ¡1 (R)) satis…es this system of equations. The …rst equality in the system holds for this pair by the de…nition of e ¼: The second equality holds since G ¡1 (R) ¡ R ¡ h(G ¡1 (R)) = G ¡1 (R) ¡ R ¡ g(G ¡1 (R); G ¡1 (R)) = 0: The claim follows then by the proof of Proposition 4.5.
Proof of Proposition 4.7
Standard incentive-compatibility arguments imply that the equilibrium probability of winning must be weakly increasing in type. It is then enough to show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which the bidding strategies are weakly increasing in type 69 . 69 The weak monotonicity argument yields the following: Assume that there is an equilibrium in which bidder i's strategy displays a region Proof. Consider …rst a symmetric equilibrium pro…le (b 1 ; b 2 ) such that the function b = b 1 = b 2 is constant on an interval as above 70 . By the de…nition of an equilibrium, type ¼ a of bidder 1 prefers bidding b ¤ rather than b ¤ ¡ "; where " > 0: This yields
Analogously, type ¼ b prefers bidding b ¤ rather than b ¤ + "; which yields:
The last two equations yield ¼ a¸¼b ; which is a contradiction 71 . Consider now the case of an asymmetric bidding pro…le, and assume that bidder's 1 strategy exhibits pooling at a level b ¤ where b ¤ is in the range of b 2 (see assumption 8.26): If bidder's 2 strategy also displays pooling at b ¤ ; then we conclude by the same argument as in the symmetric case. Otherwise, the optimal bid for any
; which cannot be a constant. Consider now the following class of strategies:
where L i is a strictly increasing function. Lemma 8.1 shows that, in equilibrium, e¤ective pooling can only take place at the reserve price. Hence, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, there exists a pair of strategies in the above class that form an equilibrium. We now show that no such pair exists. Consider …rst the case of a symmetric equilibrium where strategies have the above form. The system of equations 4.11 reads now 70 In this case assumption 8.26 is automatically satis…ed. 71 Note that this argument does not work for b ¤ = R; since then a bid b ¤ ¡ " has other consequences. : However,
for all k > 0: This concludes the proof that no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Consider now an asymmetric equilibrium having the form given in 8.29. Type e e ¼ 1 must be indi¤erent between bidding R and bidding R + "; yielding:
( Since k < 1; and since1 1¸R (see the proof of Proposition 4.5) we obtain a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
All types that decide to pay the fee face a second-price auction with a zero reserve price. The fact that the bid G(¼ i ) is optimal for a type ¼ i that enters the auction follows in the same manner as in Proposition 4.1. It remains to show that the respective entry/non-entry decisions are optimal. Consider the type ¼ E of buyer 1, and assume that buyer 2 plays according to strategy b 2 . By staying out, the payo¤ of type ¼ E is given by
